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the next “edition” of the sulbastitras will pay more serious attention to the need 
for and the needs of textual criticism. If Indology is to make progress, it must 
begin to deal with the wealth of material that awaits investigation in Indian and 
non-Indian libraries. 
Statistics in Britain, 1865-1930: The Social Construction of Scientific Knowledge. 
By Donald A. MacKenzie. (Edinburgh University press). 1981. VIII + 306 
PP. 
Reviewed by Ivo Schneider 
Institut fiir Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften der Universitiit Miinchen, Manich, 
Federal Republic of Germany 
I begin my review with a confession. I find the book very attractive but for 
reasons which are different from the author’s intentions. Why this is so, I shall try 
to explain. 
Statistics in Britain, 18651930 is a topic of great interest for historians of 
mathematics. This interest is due in part to the lack of monographic literature on 
this crucial period in the formation of modem statistics. Moreover, the develop- 
ment of modern statistics seems to offer a case study for the formation of a 
discipline. According to the subtitle of the book, this process is to be understood 
as “social construction.” 
Whether one argues as Helen Walker did in her Studies in the History of 
Statistical Method [I9291 that statistics is an offspring of probability theory, espe- 
cially error theory, or if one pleads for a more independent genesis of statistics 
because the methods of error theory more than once proved inadequate for the 
solution of the problems of biometrics, statistics as it developed after 1900 shares 
with probability theory the status of an applied science. 
As a mathematical discipline in its own right, probability theory figured little up 
to the late 1920s. It lacked both a clear foundation and methods of its own; most of 
the mathematical tools of 19th-century probability theory were borrowed from 
analysis. It could boast the solution of few problems outside the classical domain 
of games of chance. The most promising domain of application at the turn of the 
century appeared to be physics, especially statistical mechanics. According to 
Hilbert at least-who in 1900 called probability theory a physical discipline be- 
cause statistical mechanics seemed to him the only important domain of applica- 
tion of the theory-the problems and the methods of solution of this physical 
discipline would have a strong relation to the underlying physics. In the same 
way, statistics, considered as the aggregate of mathematical tools for biometrics, 
would have a strong relation to biometrics; and biometrics was concerned with 
socially relevant issues of the eugenic movement in Great Britain, This is the 
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trivial justification of the subtitle The Social Construction of Scientijc Know& 
edge. 
MacKenzie’s nontrivial claim is that even the choice of mathematical methods 
in the birth of statistics was determined by “interests” that can be labeled as 
social. But “determined” does not necessarily mean for the author that the same 
interests shared by another statistician would lead to the same choice. MacKenzie 
is not concerned with causality. He never tries to explain why a thing happened; 
he just “explains” what happened. In order to show the connection between 
society and the eugenic movement on the one hand and statistics on the other, he 
first tries to justify the link between eugenics and society by suggesting “a theory 
of the relationship between eugenic beliefs and the social structure” (chapter 2). 
Accordingly “eugenics was-and is-an ideology expressing particular social 
interests.” The book describes mainly the statistical work of Francis Galton, Karl 
Pearson, and R. A. Fisher. “The shape of the science they developed,” says 
MacKenzie, “was partially determined by eugenic objectives.” In chapter 4 he 
shows that Pearson’s “thinking in various crucial areas was an exceptionally clear 
manifestation of the social interests of the class to which he belonged.” Chapter 5 
discusses the “crucial connection” between Pearson’s research institute devoted 
to statistical theory and eugenics. In chapter 6 “different ways of doing biology, 
and differing social interests, can be seen as involved in the clash” between 
biometricians and Mendelians. In chapter 7 it is argued that the differing ap- 
proaches to association adopted by Pearson and his former pupil George Udny 
Yule “reflected” different goals in the development of statistical theory which can 
“be related to different attitudes to eugenics.” These expressions, stemming from 
MacKenzie’s summary of his intentions in the introduction (chapter I), appear 
again and again. Again in a similar way: “Galton’s work on correlation was partly 
inspired by eugenics” and, moreover, “Galton’s eugenics thus accounts at least in 
part for his invention of correlation. ” One can see “Galton’s eugenics not merely 
as providing the motive” but also “as conditioning the content” of his statistical 
work. 
Now, what can be done with these relationships? There is a case in which 
MacKenzie explains both what he is aiming at and the limits of his approach. In 
the chapter on the controversy between biometricians and Mendelians, he sug- 
gests “that biometry was an appropriate worldview” for the rising class of profes- 
sional experts and that, on the other hand, the biology of the Mendelian Bateson 
“was an appropriate account of nature for romantic-conservatives . . . which 
was used to advocate a form of society congenial to their interests.” Apart from 
the difficulty in denying biologists the status of professional experts, MacKenzie 
confesses that he does not feel “justified in going beyond these claims into the 
realm of the explanation of individual behaviour or the imputation of individual 
motives.” Here we are-individual behavior might even contradict the interests 
and perhaps convictions of the group, but it would not alter the announced rela- 
tionship between social structure and statistics. And there is the case of William 
Sealy Gosset, alias “Student,” who became a very successful member of the 
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group of biometricians in contributing to the content of “scientific knowledge” 
without sharing the group’s social-eugenical convictions. MacKenzie feels obliged 
to explain this case in terms of “the ultimate vulnerability of the tight connection 
between statistics and eugenics that the school embodied.” Somebody not bound 
to defend such a “tight connection” would be free to interpret the situation in 
a different and more straightforward way. The example of Gosset would show that 
a science of statistics grown out of biometrics, or out of biometrics shaped by 
eugenic intentions, proved applicable to other domains that had no relation what- 
soever to eugenics. Since statistics is concerned with mass phenomena and popu- 
lations, its methods should become applicable to all areas where there are mass 
phenomena, in particular when the objects are populations as in economics. Had 
it been econometrics (which in fact started around 1930) and not biometrics to 
which we owe the methods of statistics, MacKenzie could have written an “eco- 
nomic construction” of scientific knowledge. The connection between biometrics 
and statistics is a historical fact. The social relevance of eugenics for biometrics is 
a fact, too, that has been nicely illustrated by MacKenzie. It is grist for the 
sociologist’s mill but nothing else. Mathematicians and historians of mathematics 
more accustomed to think in causal chains might occasionally feel uneasy with the 
sometimes weak “relations,” “connections,” and “links” between the social 
world and statistics. But despite the warning given by the author in the beginning 
that “many important innovations [in statistical theory] will receive little or no 
attention,” the book contains a generally fair, fresh, and readable account of the 
main issues in statistics from 1865 to 1930. 
